This paper provides a counterexample about the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of a discounted Hamilton-Jacobi equation, as the discount factor vanishes. The Hamiltonian of the equation is a 1-dimensional continuous and coercive Hamiltonian.
Introduction and main result
Let n ≥ 1. Denote by T n = R n /Z n the n-dimensional torus. For c ∈ R, consider the HamiltonJacobi equation
H(x, Du(x)) = c (E 0 )
where the Hamiltonian H : T n × R n → R is jointly continuous and coercive in the momentum. In order to build solutions of the above equation, Lions, Papanicolaou and Varadhan [6] have introduced a technique called ergodic approximation. For λ ∈ (0, 1], consider the discounted Hamilton-Jacobi equation λv λ (x) + H(x, Dv λ (x)) = 0 (E λ ) (1.1)
By a standard argument, this equation has a unique viscosity solution v λ : T n → R. Moreover, (−λv λ ) converges uniformly as λ vanishes to a constant c(H) called the critical value. Set u λ := v λ + c(H)/λ. The family (u λ ) is equi-Lipschitz, and converges uniformly along subsequences towards a solution of (E 0 ), for c = c(H). Note that (E 0 ) may have several solutions. Recently, under the assumption that H is convex in the momentum, Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique [2] have proved that (u λ ) converges uniformly (towards a solution of (E 0 )). In addition, they proved that the solution can be characterized using Mather measures and Peierls barriers. Without the convexity assumption, the question of whether (u λ ) converges or not remained open. This paper solves negatively this question and provides a 1-dimensional continuous and coercive Hamiltonian for which (u λ ) does not converge * .
Theorem 1.1. There exists a continuous Hamiltonian H : T 1 × R → R that is coercive in the momentum, such that u λ does not converge as λ tends to 0.
The example builds on a class of discrete-time repeated games called stochastic games. The main ingredient is to establish a connection between recent counterexamples to the existence of the limit value in stochastic games (see [8, 9] ) and the Hamilton-Jacobi problem † . The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stochastic game example. Section 3 shows that in order to prove Theorem 1.1, it is enough to study the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic game, when the discount factor vanishes. Section 4 determines the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic game.
The stochastic game example
Given a finite set A, the set of probability measures over A is denoted by ∆(A). Given a ∈ A, the Dirac measure at a is denoted by δ a .
Description of the game
Consider the following stochastic game Γ, described by:
• A state space K with two elements ω 1 and ω −1 :
• An action set I = {0, 1} for Player 1,
• A payoff function g :
The stochastic game Γ k 1 starting at k 1 proceeds as follows:
• The initial state is k 1 . At first stage, Player 2 chooses j 1 ∈ J and announces it to Player 1. Then, Player 1 chooses i 1 ∈ I, and announces it to Player 2. The payoff at stage 1 is g(k 1 , i 1 , j 1 ) for Player 1, and −g(k 1 , i 1 , j 1 ) for Player 2. A new state k 2 is drawn from the probability q(. |k 1 , i 1 , j 1 ) and announced to both players. Then, the game moves on to stage 2.
• At each stage m ≥ 2, Player 2 chooses j m ∈ J and announces it to Player 1. Then, Player 1 chooses i m ∈ I, and announces it to Player 2. The payoff at stage m is g(k m , i m , j m ) for Player 1, and −g(k m , i m , j m ) for Player 2. A new state k m+1 is drawn from the probability q(. |k m , i m , j m ) and announced to both players. Then, the game moves on to stage m + 1. † Let us mention the work [4, 5, 3, 10] as other illustrations of the use of repeated games in PDE problems. 
The left-hand side matrix stands for state ω 1 , and the right-hand side matrix stands for state ω −1 . Consider the left-hand side matrix. Player 1 chooses a row (either 1 or 0), and Player 2 chooses a column (either 1 or 0). The payoff is given by the numbers: for instance, g(1, 1) = 1 and g(1, 0) = 0. The arrow means that when the corresponding actions are played, the state moves on to state ω −1 ; otherwise, it stays in ω 1 . For instance, q(.|ω 1 , 1, 1) = δ ω 1 and q(.|ω 1 , 1, 0) = δ ω −1 . The interpretation is the same for the right-hand side matrix. In the game Γ, Player 1 can play only pure actions (1 or 0), and Player 2 can play 1 with some probability j ∈ J. This matrix representation is convenient to understand the strategic aspects of the game.
Let us now define formally strategies. In general, the decision of a player at stage m may depend on all the information he has: that is, the stage m, and all the states and actions before stage m. In this paper, it is sufficient to consider a restricted class of strategies, called stationary strategies. Formally, a stationary strategy for Player 1 is defined as a mapping y : K × J → I. The interpretation is that at stage m, if the current state is k, and Player 2 plays j, then Player 1 plays y(k, j). Thus, Player 1 only bases his decision on the current state and the current action of Player 2. Denote by Y the set of stationary strategies for Player 1. A stationary strategy for Player 2 is defined as a mapping z : K → J. The interpretation is that at stage m, if the current state is k, then Player 2 plays z(k). Thus, Player 2 only bases his decision on the current state. Denote by Z the set of stationary strategies for Player 2.
generated along the game is called history of the game. Due to the fact that state transitions are random, this is a random variable. The law of this random variable depends on the initial state k 1 and the pair of strategies (y, z), and is denoted by P k 1 y,z . We will call g m the m-stage random payoff g(k m , i m , j m ). Let λ ∈ (0, 1]. The game Γ k 1 λ is the game where the strategy set of Player 1 (resp. 2) is Y (resp. Z), and the payoff is γ k 1 λ , where
The goal of Player 1 is to maximize this quantity, while the goal of Player 2 is to minimize this quantity. The game Γ k 1 λ has a value, that is: min
The value of Γ k 1 λ is then defined as the above quantity, and is denoted by w λ (k 1 ). A strategy for Player 1 is optimal if it achieves the right-hand side maximum, and a strategy for Player 2 is optimal if it achieves the left-hand side minimum. The interpretation is that if players are rational they should play optimal strategies, and as a result Player 1 should get w λ (k 1 ), and Player 2 should get −w λ (k 1 ).
Asymptotic behavior of the discounted value
Proposition 2.2. The following hold:
The proof of the above proposition is done in Section 4. As far as the proof of Theorem 1.1 is concerned, the key point is (ii). is Let us give here some piece of intuition for this result. Consider the game Γ ′ that is identical to Γ, except that Player 2's action set is . Moreover, for all n ≥ 1, p * (λ n ) ∈ J. Thus, this strategy is available for Player 2 in Γ, and consequently w λn (ω 1 ) = w ′ λn (ω 1 ) + O(λ n ), as n tends to infinity. On the other hand, for all n ≥ 1, p * (µ n ) / ∈ J, and the distance of p * (µ n ) to J is larger than
µ n /2. Consequently, the distance of the optimal strategy in Γ ω 1 µn to the optimal strategy in Γ ′ω 1 µn is of order µ n . This produces a payoff difference of order µ n at each stage, and thus of order 1 in the whole game. Thus, Player 2 is significantly disadvantaged in Γ ω 1 µn compared to Γ ′ω 1 µn , and the difference between w µn (ω 1 ) and w ′ µn (ω 1 ) is of order 1.
Remark 2.3. As we shall see in the following section, we have lim λ→0 λw λ (ω 1 ) = lim λ→0 λw λ (ω −1 ) = 0.
The next section explains how to derive the counterexample and Theorem 1.1 from Proposition 2.2. 
Using the fact that q(ω r |ω r , i, j) = 1 − q(ω −r |ω r , i, j) yields the result.
For p ∈ R, define H 1 : R → R and H −1 : R → R by 
Consequently, Proposition 3.1 (ii) yields
Note that the above equation is identical to equation (3.2) . The reason why we use the notation u λ and not v λ is that, as we shall see, c(H) = 0, thus u λ coincides with v λ . Extend u λ and H(., p) (p ∈ R) as 2-periodic functions defined on R. The Hamiltonian H is continuous and coercive in the momentum, and the above equation holds in a classical sense for all x ∈ R \ Z. For x ∈ R, denote by D + u λ (x) (resp., D − u λ (x)) the super-differential (resp., the sub-differential) of u λ at x. Let us show that u λ is a viscosity solution of (3.2) on R. By 2-periodicity, it is enough to show that this is a viscosity solution for x = 0 and x = 1. Let us start by x = 0. We have
Consequently, u λ is a viscosity solution at x = 0.
Consider now the case x = 1. We have
Consequently, u λ is a viscosity solution at x = 1. Let us now conclude the proof of Theorem 1.1. Because H is 2-periodic, equation (3.2) can be considered as written on T 1 .
As noticed before, equation (3.2) is identical to equation (1.1). Therefore, as stated in the introduction, −λu λ converges to c(H). Proposition 2.2 (ii) implies that (−λ n u λn (1)) converges to 0, thus c(H) = 0. Still by Proposition 2.2 (ii), (u λ (1)) does not have a limit when λ tends to 0: Theorem 1.1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.2

Proof of (i)
Consider Proposition 3.1 (i) for r = 1. Take j = 1/2 ∈ J. It yields
Take i = 1/2. This yields
For r = −1, taking j = 1/2 and then i = 1/2 produce the following inequalities: 
Proof of (ii)
For (i, i ′ ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , consider the strategy y of Player 1 that plays i in ω 1 and i ′ in ω −1 (regardless of Player 2's actions), and the strategy z of Player 2 that plays a in state ω 1 , and b in state ω −1 . Denote γ
Proposition 4.1. The following hold:
2.
• γ 0,0 λ is decreasing with respect to a and increasing with respect to b.
λ is increasing with respect to a and decreasing with respect to b.
• γ 1,0 λ is increasing with respect to a and b.
• γ 0,1 λ is decreasing with respect to a and b.
Proof.
1. The payoffs γ 
Combining these two relations give the first equality. The three other equalities can be derived in a similar fashion.
2. These monotonicity properties are simply obtained by deriving γ i,i ′ λ with respect to a and b.
Define a strategy y of Player 1 in the following way:
• in state ω 1 , play 0 if j ≤ p * (λ), play 1 otherwise, 2. Let z be a strategy of Player 2, and a = z(ω 1 ) and b = z(ω −1 ). Note that the interval (p * (µ n /2), p * (2µ n )) does not intersect J.
The following cases are distinguished:
Case 1. a ≤ p * (µ n ) and b ≤ p * (µ n ), thus a ≤ p * (µ n /2) and b ≤ p * (µ n /2)
We have γ ω 1 µn (y, z) = γ Case 3. a ≥ p * (µ n ) and b ≤ p * (µ n ), thus a ≥ p * (2µ n ) and b ≤ p * (µ n /2)
We have γ ω 1 µn (y, z) = γ Case 4. a ≥ p * (µ n ) and b ≥ p * (µ n ), thus a ≥ p * (2µ n ) and b ≥ p * (2µ n )
We have γ ω 1 µn (y, z) = γ Among these cases, the smallest limit is 
